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Australia. ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the causes of  asset price inflation and deflation in the 
Australian economy, their links with borrowing and recent problems that 
have arisen for banks' balance sheets. Implications for the business cycle and 
monetary policy are drawn out in some detail.  The difficulties encountered 
are  attributed  partly  to  the  once-for-all  transition  from  regulated  to 
deregulated financial markets, and it is  argued that it would be wrong to 
extrapolate recent  developments into the  future .  It  is  suggested  that 
arguments to make asset price inflation an explicit objective of  monetary 
policy are not helpful.  The paper goes to point out some encouraging new 
trends  in  Australia's  linkages  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  Export 
performance  has been  greatly  enhanced  by  longer-term  reforms  and 
exchange rate depreciation during the 1980s. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since  the  early  1980s, business  cycle  dynamics  and  the  transmission 
mechanisms of  monetary policy have been subject to important changes in 
Australia.  To a large extent, these changes derive from the deregulation of 
financial  markets.  But  the  floating of the  Australian  dollar, and  the 
increased integration of  the Australian economy in world trade generally, 
and in the Asian region in particular, have also played an important role, 
During the late  1970s and the first half of the 1980s a number of  OECD 
countries liberalised their financial markets.  In  Australia's case this was 
carried out over a relatively short period of  time in the early 1980s.  Such 
changes should reduce the vulnerability of  economies to business cycles. This 
is because financial regulations impose liquidity constraints on the behaviour 
of  the private sector, making it more vulnerable to transitory shocks to the 
real economy, often considered to be the main source of  cyclical fluctuations 
in business activity.  In Australia's case, fluctuations in the terms of  trade, 
government outlays, taxes, world demand, and rural sector output (due to 
weather conditions), would impact on current income.  In the presence of 
regulations which inhibit the capital markets, the private sector's current 
spending would be strongly affected, thereby amplifying the disturbance.  As 
financial markets are liberalised, expenditure is more easily sn~oothed  by 
borrowing and lending.  Views about expected future income and wealth, 
given relative financial prices, should be more important determinants of 
current spending than income or cash flow in the current period. 
At first glance, Australia's experience in the second half of  the 1980s and the 
early 1990s gives few  grounds for confidence about this vie\\. of  the working 
of  free finailcia1  markets.  Financial  liberalisation did  not  appear to be 
associated with a reduction in the frequency or amplitude of  the business cycle.  Only the broad characteristics of the cycle seemed to change.  Thus, 
the sharp upswing in economic activity and investment in the late 1980s had 
three unusual features: 
(i) strong asset price inflation; 
(ii) rapid growth in corporate borrowing from financial intermediaries; 
and 
(iii) the absence of any upsurge in goods price inflation, despite the 
strength of  demand. 
Subsequently, the  asset  price  inflation  was  reversed,  creating  severe 
problems for financial intermediaries that provided the flood of  credit in the 
1980s.  Credit growth slowed, and then became negative.  The economy 
experienced a relatively deep recession, and an unusually slow recovery 
from it in the early 1990s, during which time inflation fell to historically low 
levels. 
These broad patterns were not  unique to Australia.  Indeed, the United 
States, Japan, the United  Kingdom, Canada and some of  the Scandinavian 
countries have all experienced strikingly similar developments.  All  had 
relatively strong real growtl~,  asset price inflation and increased gearing in 
the second half of  the 1980s, while asset price deflation and high outstanding 
levels of  debt appear to  be major  factors inhibiting recovery  during the 
1990s.  These countries had in common importai~t  moves to liberalise their 
financial systems during the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The reduced constraints on the behaviour of  financial intermediaries and the 
increased  role  of  asset  prices,  therefore,  seem  to  be  important  for 
understanding  the changed characteristics of  the business cycle in  recent 
years.  There is a need to review this experience with a view to identifying 
major influences on asset prices and borrowing, and to draw lessons for the 
future conduct of  monetary policy.  Of  particular interest is the question of 
whether the difficulties in recent  years are endemic to free markets, and 
might  be  expected to continue.  Alternatively,  were the problems more 
period-specific,  resultii~g  from the release in pent-up demand during the 
transition from regulated to deregulated financial markets? Historically,  the  terms  of trade  has been  a  major  source  of  cyclical 
fluctuations in the Australian economy.  As a mainly commodity-exporting 
country, the world commodity price cycle dominates large movements in 
Australia's  terms of  trade.  Prior to the floating of  the Australian dollar ($A) 
in December 1983, income effects generated by these fluctuations contributed 
to major inflationary and deflationary episodes. In theory, the floating of  the 
$A should have greatly reduced this source of  business cycle disturbance, 
acting as a shock absorber in the face of  such real shocks.  A rise in the terms 
of  trade, for example, increases real incomes, generating excess demand for 
non-traded goods.  The exchange rate appreciates, causing substitution in 
demand towards imports, thereby offsetting the inflationary pressure. 
In this way the floating $A should greatly facilitate the role of  monetary 
policy  in  achieving a  low-inflation outcome.  Sometimes, however,  tlre 
"cost"  of  tlris  is severe ~noveinents  in competitiveness of  the  Australian 
traded-goods sector.  Wheir tlre exchange rate appreciates in  respoirse to a 
strong rise in world commodity prices, the colninodity sector is less affected 
because it benefits from strong demand and prices for its products.  But the 
loss of  competitiveness may be much more damaging for tlre ma~rufacturing 
and services sectors.  Thus, it has been  argued, while floating helps to 
contain the terins of  trade as a source of  inflation cycles, it is likely to inhibit 
the development of  non-commodity exports.  Such diversification nniglrt be 
important  fro111  tlre  perspective  of  longer-run  growtlr  and  welfare. 
Furthermore, exclrange rate inovements have a direct impact on prices, and 
may themselves lead to wage-price interactions.  There is, t1re11, a need for 
some assessment of  Australia's experience with floating exclrairge  rates in 
tlre conduct of  monetary policy. 
Section 2  examines Australia's experience with asset price inflation  and 
borrowing during the most recent cycle in economic activity and ~nflation. 
The role  of tlre  exchange rate  in  changing business cycle  and inflation 
dynamics is reviewed in Section 3.  Finally, some concludi~rg  remarks are 
offered in Section 4. 2.  ASSET PRICE INFLATION, BORROWING AND THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE 
(a)  Developments Following Financial Deregulation 
During  the  early 1980s,  the more-or-less  complete deregulation of  the 
Australian financial system proceeded very rapidly.  The most important 
regulatory changes were: 
the lifting of interest ceilings in 1980 (except for owner-occupied housing); 
credit directives ceasing by the end of  1981; 
the introduction of a tender system for all government securities by 1982, 
which permitted the separation of  monetary and debt management; 
the floating of  the $A and removal of  all exchange controls by December 
1983; and 
the domestic banking system being opened to competition froin foreign 
banks by 1985. 
In addition, there were important innovations in the financial system, as 
assets with  characteristics similar  to  money  began  to  multiply.  Cash 
management trusts emerged, for exan~ple,  and were instrumental ill forcing 
banks to offer competitive n~arket-related  interest rates on deposits. 
These changes greatly  enhanced the  market's  perception  of  the  future 
profitability  of banks.  Figure 2.1 shows bank  share prices and the  All 
Ordinaries index.  Bank share prices rose even inore quickly than the market 
average from early 1984, greatly enhancing banks'  ability to finance new 
lending.  Moreover,  credit  could  be  allocated  according  to  the  price 
mechanism, rather than by quantity rationing (with banks choosing the least 
risky amongst queues of  borrowers).  Banks became "liability  managers", 
first deciding how much to lend, and then using their control over deposit 
rates to attract the funds. These develop~nents  improved longer-run growtlj 
possibilities from  the supply side of  the financial system. Figure 2.1 
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But business expectations also became more buoyai~t  from the mid 1.980~~ 
greatly enhancing the demand for loans: 
the recovery from the 1983 recession was rapid, and profits rose in  the 
cyclical upswing; 
the new Labor Governmei~t  implemented a "Prices and Incomes Accord" 
with  the union  movement, which effectively reduced real wages  and 
increased the profit share of  GDP; 
in the early stage of  the recovery fiscal policy was initially expansionary, 
but by 1985 the government implemented a longer-run program of  fiscal 
consolidation to reduce the constraints on growth imposed by the balance 
of  payments situation; and 
as the 1980s proceeded, the government embarked upon a broad program 
of  other  micro-economic  reforms.  Tax  reforms,  includii~g  the 
introduction  of  dividend  imputation  in  1987,  were  of particular 
importance. Economic growth and investment accelerated rapidly from the end of  1983, 
and while being checked by  tighter  monetary policy  in  1985 and 1986, 
accelerated again as the world economy picked up momentum in the second 
half of  the 1980s.  New investment was particularly strong at this time, with 
business credit provided by financial intermediaries playing an important 
role in financing it, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 
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Improved growth expectations certainly appear to have been reflected in the 
behaviour of asset  prices.  Figure 2.3 shows equity  prices, comme1.cia1 
property  prices and l~ouse  prices in  the  first  panel, and aggregate asset 
prices in  the second.'  Equity prices began to rise sharply relative to the 
co1Isumer  prices from 1984.  While Australia11 share prices fell  wit11  the 
world-wide market break in October 1987, the price  of  equities remained 
relatively high (compared with a basket of  consumer goods). Moreover, the 
other components of  wealth began to inflate more rapidly in the late 1980s. 
Commercial property prices rose sharply from mid 1987, peaking in 1989.  At 
this  time  there was sustantial investment in hotels, shopping centres and 
offices. Residential house prices rose on a sustained basis from the middle of 
1987. 
Weighted by the average components of  wealth derived in Callen (1991) Figure 2.3 
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Aggregate Asset Price Index While fundamentals certainly were a factor in the initial rise in asset prices, 
it is also possible that speculative dynamics were important in continuing the 
process.  Recent research has stressed the importance of positive feedback in 
asset price behaviour - a rising market leads to further price increases, and 
vice versa.  Positive feedback effects from rising asset prices in the domestic 
economy, or through international spillover effects, can push asset prices 
beyond levels justified  by  fundamentals.  Such increases risk  excessive 
growth in nominal wealth, and hence demand, with adverse consequences 
for inflation. 
There are reasons  to  believe  that the same factors which  influence the 
behaviour of  asset prices also affect borrowing from financial intermediaries 
in liberalised financial markets.  On the demand side, borrowing is likely to 
be driven by expectations about the future profitability of  investment, which 
is also reflected in the market valuation of  current assets.  Similarly, the 
demand for loans may be driven by speculative activity in circumstances of 
asset  price  inflation,  as ecoi~omic  agents  position  then~selves  to  take 
advantage of  capital gains.  On the supply side, recent theories about the 
behaviour of  financial intermediaries emphasise the impo1-tance of  11011- 
diversifiable market risk, related to the cycle in ecoi~on~ic  activity, and the 
role of  asset values in  providing collateral for loans.*  Most loan defaults 
occur in economic downturns, while asset values and levels of  collateral are 
relatively low. In these circumstances, banks tend to be relatively less willing 
to  lend.  When  the  outlook  for  activity  improves, on  the  other hand, 
perceived credit risks decline and collateral improves as asset prices begin to 
rise.  Banks and other financial institutions become more willi~~g  to lend. 
Figure 2.4 distinguisl~es  between business and housiny  <A  cl-cdit  :  t11e  groivth 
rate of  business credit  is  shown in  the top panel  with  170th  equity and 
commercial property price inflation, while housing credit is displayed wit11 
house price inflation in the middle panel. Growth rates of  credit extended by 
all financial institutions (AFI credit) and aggregate asset prices are displayed 
in the third panel of  Figure 2.4.  Asset prices are more volatile than credit. 
Nevertheless, broad swings in the components of  the asset price index, 
the aggregate index itself,  tend  to lead  the  respective  credit  variables. 
These are discussed  in  Blundell-Wignall  and Gizycki (1992).  See  in 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) Figure 2.4 
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price inflation and credit growth rose to historically very high levels.  Since 
business credit constitutes about 65 per cent of  total credit in Australia, most 
of  this sharp rise is explained by corporate borrowing.  Subsequently, asset 
price inflation declined sharply. 
To the extent credit was extended on the basis of  asset prices that were not 
based on fundamentals, but had become overvalued because of  speculative 
dynamics, it is not difficult to see how financial fragility problems might 
have emerged.  Outstanding levels of  debt would prove to be too large, and 
a period of  balance sheet restructuring and more cautious lending attitudes 
might  follow.  Figure 2.4 shows that  the  recent  decline  in  asset  prices 
precedes the marked slowing in credit growth. 
(b) beteminants of  Asset Prices 
Asset prices are conditioned by  expectations about the future and, being 
determined in auction markets, may jump quickly to new levels.  In theory, 
asset  prices are determined as the present discounted value of  expected 
future returns.  That is, they depend on expectations about future nominal 
returns, and a rate of  time discount. 
Within this framework there are three broad channels through which asset 
prices are affected: 
(i)  economic fundamentals; 
(ii) monetary policy;  and 
(iii) speculative dynamics that drive asset prices temporarily away 
from fundamentals. 
Economic fundamentals may shift because of  changes in such factors as 
financial regulations, technology, productivity, the profit share (influenced 
partly by  incomes policy), taxation arrangements, fiscal policy  and world 
economic activity. A number of  these factors, which may have contributed to 
pushing up asset prices in Australia during the second half of  the 1980s, were 
mentioned in Section 2(a). Such asset price movements should be thought of 
as perinanei~t  relative price shifts, reflecting  anticipated  changes in  real 
income and wealth. The impact of monetary policy on asset prices is not completely separate 
from the first channel, since it influences expectations about future activity 
and inflation.  At the same time, though, it  impacts on the rate at which 
future expected returns are discounted.  This is important, if  monetary policy 
is to counter excessive pressures on goods prices arising from other factors 
driving the business cycle.  However, it  also means that monetary policy 
errors may be transmitted  to  the economy through wealth effects.  Thus 
excessively easy monetary policy may give rise to asset price inflation in the 
first instance, and hence rising nominal (and real) wealth, and goods price 
inflation later on. 
The third potential influence on asset prices concerns market inefficiencies, 
which give rise to positive feedback effects, and "bubble-like"  movements in 
asset  prices unrelated  to economic fundamentals.  Cutler, Poterba  and 
Summers (1990) examined  a  wide range of asset  prices  from thirteen 
different countries, and found such effects to be so pervasive that they were 
likely  to  be  inherent  features  of  the  speculative process.  Over  short 
horizons, all asset prices appear to be driven by their recent past behaviour, 
reverting to fundamentals only in the longer run.  Such short-term asset 
price movements also influence nominal wealth, and facilitate borrowing 
and spending, with possible implications for the business cycle and inflation. 
It  is  relatively  straightforward  to  formalise these  relationships.  For 
example, if  q represents share prices, then the return on holding shares is the 
expected rate of  change of  the price of  those shares, plus the expected 
dividend return.  Arbitrage between bonds and shares therefore implies: 
where i  is the return on bonds, x is expected profits, and an "e"  superscript 
denotes expectations.  Since in the steady state the expected change in asset 
prices  is  zero  (or  perhaps  some  constant),  a  long-run  equilibrium 
relationship is implied between share prices, profits and the return on bonds: 
Similar propositions apply to other asset prices.  Thus commercial property 
prices depend on the expected changes in property values, commercial rental returns and the  interest  rate.  Residential  property  prices  depend on 
expected appreciation of  house prices, rental returns and the interest rate. 
The rest of this section examines empirical evidence on the nature of  asset 
price determination in the Australian economy.  The main interest is to see 
whether there is evidence of  speculative dynamics in the short run, with 
reversion to fundamentals in the long run.  Table 2.1 presents cointegration 
tests (using the Johansen procedure) based on the long-run relationship 
expressed in equation  (2.2)  in its  first  two panels.  Results  for  the  All 
Ordinaries share price index are shown first.  This asks wl~ether  there is a 
long-run relationship between share prices,  profits (proxied by  the total 
-gross  operating surplus in the economy available for dividend, interest and 
rental income) and the two-year bond rate.  Results for the aggregate asset 
price index are shown in the second panel, using the same explanatory 
variables.  In  neither  case  was  it  possible  to  identify  a  cointegrating 
relationship. 
The  Johansen  procedure,  unlike  other  approaches  to  cointegration, 
estimates both the long-run relationship and the short-run dynamics of  the 
model as a system.3  However, if  the short-run dynamics of  asset price 
determination are strongly influenced by other factors, it may be difficult to 
identify the underlying equilibrium relationship.  In terms of  equation (2.1), 
the expected rate of  change of asset prices in the short run may be important, 
and related to variables that play no role in equilibrium in the longer run.  If 
this were so, the inclusion  of  rates of  change of  these  other  variables, 
thought to have influenced expectations in the short-run, might improve the 
power of  the cointegration tests. 
011c i~nportant  possibility here is that extreme 111oven1e11ts in foreign asset 
prices  may  have  had  interi~ational  spillover  effects  on spcculatio~~  in 
Australian assets. The bubble-like upward movement in internalional equity 
prices in 1987, followed by the world-wide market break in October 1987, is a 
potentially  important case  in  point.  Figlire 2.3 shows a si~nilarly  sharl) 
upward movement  in  Australian  eq~~ity  prices in  1987, and s~~bseq~ent 
See Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).  The main  advantage of 
such system estimation  is  that  it facilitates  the identification of  the number of 
cointegrating relationships characterising the set of  variables Table 2.1: Asset Price Determination 
(Coin  tegra  tion Tests) 
Long-run  Short-run  Max h  Trace Cointegration 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Cointegra  tion  Test 
Test 
Share Price 
GOS  0.61 
2-year Bond Rate  0.05 
Agg. Asset Price 
GOS 
2-year Bond Rate 
Share Price 
GOS  0.97 
2-year Bond Rate  -0.10 
% Change Dow Jones  16.26 
%  Change Share Price 
(t-2) 
(Sample Period: 196963  - 1992Ql) 
Agg. Asset Price  Ho:r=3  3.96  Ho:rl3  3.96 
GOS  0.92  Ho:r=2  6.11  Ho:rl2  10.08 
2-year Bond Rate  -0.09  Ho:r=l  7.25  Ho:r<l  17.32 
% Change Dow Jones  19.17  Ho:r=O  32.66""Wo:rIO  49.99"" 
%  Change Asset  Price  0.22"" 
(t-2)  - 
Note:  The Johansen procedure is used  to test for cointegration between  the log of the 
respective asset price index, the log of  the gross operating surplus (GOS), and the two- 
year  bond  rate.  The per  cent  change of  the  Dow Jones Index  is  then  added to  the 
cointegrating system.  Four lags are used.  Three asterisks denotes rejection of the null 
hypothesis shown at the one per cent level, two asterisks at the fi1.e  per  cent level, and 
one asterisk at the ten per cent level. reversal.  It was this pattern which caused the first of the two extreme peaks 
in the aggregate asset price index during the late 1980s. 
Such international spillover effects should play no role  in determining 
longer-run equilibrium asset values for the Australian economy.  Yet their 
importance  in  the  short-run  may  make  it  difficult to  identify  the 
"fundamental"  factors detern~ining  asset prices in the longer run.  To test 
this proposition, the rate of change of the Dow Jones stock price index for 
the United States was included in the above systems. The results for the All 
Ordinaries and aggregate asset price index are reported in the third and 
fourth panels of  Table 2.1.  In both cases, it proved possible to identify a 
single cointegrating relationship.  Moreover, all of the long-run coefficients 
had the expected sign.  The domestic Gross Operating Surplus in  the 
Australian economy has a strong positive  influence 011  Australian  asset 
prices in the longer run, interest rates have a negative impact, and the rate 
of  change of  the Dow Jones index has the expected positive  sign.  In 
addition, short-run dynamics of  the share price and the aggregate asset 
price indexes, respectively, are consistent with the presence of positive 
feedback effects.  In both cases, the second lag of  the change in asset prices is 
positively and significantly correlated with their level in the current period. 
(c)  Credit and Asset Prices 
It has long been thought that much of the borrowing in the 1980s in countries 
such  as the  United  States, Japan, the  United  Kingdom, Scandinavian 
countries and Australia was related to the marked rise in asset prices.  In 
Australia, this argument was first advanced by Macfarlane (1989).4  The sort 
of  model that underlies a lot of  thinking about this period  is set out in 
Goodhart (1992).  Modifying this model to be consistent with equilibrium 
prevailing in the long run, loan demand is given by: 
In  the case of  business lending by  Australian  financial  intermediaries, Blundell- 
Wignall  and Gizycki  (1992) find  that  the market  value of  corporate equity  (as 
collateral) is  a  key  deterrnii~ai~t  of  loan supply, in  a n~odel  of  the  demand and 
supply functions for business loai~s. where q is the share price or, alternatively, the aggregate asset price index, i 
is the loan rate, and L is the outstanding stock of  loans.  Loan demand may 
depend  positively  on  the  level  of  asset  prices,  which  summarises 
expectations about future income and wealth.  The sign is  ambiguous, 
however, because it is possible that borrowers may substitute to other forms 
of  finance as asset prices change. For example, if equity prices are very high, 
there may be substitutioi~  towards equity finance.  Loan demand depends 
negatively on the loan rate.  Loan supply is given by: 
It depends positively  on the actual level of  asset prices, which determine 
wealth and hence collateral available to banks, and positively on the interest 
rate.  Loan supply and demand also depend negatively on the level of 
outstanding debt in this model. 
Setting loan supply equal to loan demand yields a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the outstanding level of  credit, the level of  asset prices, 
and the interest rate: 
L = h(q, i),  h '5  0,  h ;  5 0  (2.5) 
As before, short-run dynamics, which may be important for identifying the 
long-run equilibrium between these variables, are autoinatically taken into 
account when the Johansen procedure is used to estimate equation (2.5). 
This implies estimating the cointegrating rela tionship between credit, asset 
prices and the interest rate.  While the expected signs are ambiguous, their 
estimated empirical values will provide some insight into the longer-run 
relationship between asset prices and credit. 
The results are presented in Table 2.2 for the share price index in the first 
panel, and the aggregate asset price index in the second panel. In both cases, 
there appears to  be  a  single cointegrating vector,  iinplj~ing  a  long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the level of  credit, the value of  assets and 
the interest rate. The long-run coefficients are positive for asset prices and 
negative for the interest rate.  T11e  positive asset price coefficient suggests 
that expected wealth on the demand side, and the value of  asset collateral 
on the supply side, dominate any (negative) substit~ltioi~  effects in demand. Table 2.2:  Asset Prices and Credit 
(Cointegration Tests) 
Long-run  Shor  t-run  Max h  Trace Cointegratior 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Cointegration  Test 
Test 
(Sample Period:  1976Q1 - 1992Ql) 
AFI Credit  Ho:r=2  4.49  Ho:rl2  4.49 
Share Price Index  1.35  Ho:r=l  12.34  Ho:rll  16.84 
Loan Rate/100  -1.57  No:r=O  23.56""  Ho:rlO  40.39"" 
% Change Credit  -0.92""" 
(t-1) 
AFI Credit  Ho:r=2  3.73  Ho:rl2  3.73 
Agg. Asset Price  1.62  Ho:r=l  10.56  Ho:rSl  14.30 
Loan Rate/100  -1.72  Ho:r=O  27.82""" Ho:r<O  42.12"" 
% Change Credit  -0.92""" 
(t-1) 
Note:  The Johansen procedure is  used  to  test  for cointegration between  the log of 
credit, the log of  the share or asset price index, and the loan rate.  Six lags are used. 
Three asterisks  denotes rejection  of  the null hypothesis  shown at the one per  cent 
level, two asterisks at the five per cent level, and one asterisk at the ten per cenl level. 
The negative interest rate sign suggests that demand-side factors dominate 
any (positive) supply-side effects of  the level of  interest rates. 
These results are consistent with the views outlined earlier concerning how 
financial fragility problems might arise.  As  asset prices start to rise, loan 
demand rises for speculative purposes, and loan supply expands because 
rising nominal wealth  provides adequate collateral.  However, if asset 
prices overshoot, because of  positive  feedback, or international spillovf  r effects, their reversal will leave outstanding levels of debt that are "too 
large".  In the absence of  renewed growth in asset prices, equilibrium can be 
restored only by winding back the outstanding stock of credit.  To the extent 
that credit is important in financing expenditure, this will have implications 
for the business cycle. 
(d)  Some Implications for Monetary Policy 
Economic  theory suggests that  monetary policy  in liberalised  financial 
markets influences economic activity and inflation (via the Phillips curve) 
through wealth and intertemporal substitution effects.  Causation is from 
monetary  policy  to  unobservable expected  future income,  wealth  and 
spending.  Credit does not itself cause economic activity, but it may reflect 
intertemporal substitution and wealth effects. 
The central role of  asset prices in leading the business cycle is illustrated in 
Figure 2.5,  which shows the output gap (measured relative  to  a  trend 
defined  by  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter)  and  the  four-quarter-ended 
percentage change in the aggregate asset price index.  The rate of  growth of 
credit is also shown in the second panel, though here the relationship is more 
tenuous, with credit leading the upturn in 1988 and the downturn in the early 
1990s, but at other times lagging the cycle in real activity.  Econometric 
evidence derived from estimating equation (2.6) over the period 1969 Q3 to 
1992 Q1, confirms that aggregate asset prices are a highly significant leading 
indicator of  the output gap: 
4  4  ' 
(lny - lny')  = const + Za(lny - lny )t-i + Zpi ~lnq,-, 
i=l  i=l 
Ho : a1  ..... a4  = 0  Chi - Square Value 50.22*** 
Ho :  .....PI = 0  Chi - Square Value 10.37** 
Three asterisks denotes significance at the 1 per cent level and two asterisks 
at the 5 per cent level. 
This linkage between asset prices in the monetary transmission mechanism 
and the output gap is important, since a prii~cipal  objective of  monetary policy is to  achieve low inflation.  Previous research has shown that  the 
output gap has had a significant and stable influence on Australian inflation 
over sample periods estimated  to  the late 1980s.5  This is illustrated in 
Figure 2.6,  which  shows the  output  gap  and  the  four-quarter-ended 
percentage  change  in  the  consumption  deflator.  Subsequently,  this 
relationship  weakened;  the  late  1980s  saw a  very  strong upswing  in 
economic activity which did not result in increased inflation. 
The main explanation of  this recent anomaly is the success of  the Accord in 
containing wages growth despite tight labour market conditions.  Wage 
restraint in the face of  rising nominal demand implied a continuation of 
earlier improvements in Gross Operating Surplus (GOS) during the 1980s. 
Profits rose through 1987 and 1988, while interest rates at first declined (see 
Figure 2.7).  These pressures, however, appear to have spilled over into the 
asset price inflation that was under way at the time.  Consistent with the 
above empirical  findings, the divergent movements of  GOS and interest 
rates contributed to the strength of  asset prices in the late 1980s. As nominal 
wealth rose, so too  did collateral available to banks for lending, further 
fueling asset price inflation. 
Figure 2.5 
Asset Prices and the Business Cycle 
( 4 - Quarter - Ended Percentage Change  1 
5  See Blundell-Wignall, Lowe and Tarditi (1992). Figure 2.5 (cont.) 
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Strong profits, favourable business expectations, rising asset prices  and 
related borrowing contributed to the strength of  economic activity during 
the upswing ~II  the business cycle in the late 1980s. While the Accord could 
delay the impact of  strong economic activity on inflation for a time, it could 
not be expected  to  do so indefinitely.  If  monetary policy  had not been 
tightened in the late 1980s, increased demand pressures would eventually 
have led to a rise in goods price inflation.  Since wealth effects are a key 
element of  the monetary transmission mechanism, any "cooling" of  economic 
activity required the asset price inflation be brought to a halt. 
Perhaps  the  most  important  lesson  of  this  period,  however,  is  that 
speculative increases in  asset prices and borrowing, once under way, are 
difficult to reverse in the short run. During such periods, asset prices appear 
to be  less directly responsive to  monetary policy, iinplying the need  for 
higher interest rates than would otherwise be the case.  This appears to be 
due to anticipated capital gains from speculative buying which, if  realised, 
would make even very high nominal interest rates seem of  less consequence. 
Reinforcing this, as Macfarlane (1989) has empl~asised,  the tax deductability 
of  nominal interest payinei~ts  for businesses encouraged borrowing (rather than use of  equity) to finance asset purchases.  These circumstances were 
somewhat akin to a "knife edge", making it difficult to control the extent to 
which expectations about the future would decline, once the asset price 
inflation was reversed. 
A second implication of  the above analysis is that banks do not appear to 
have  distinguished  between  collateral  values  justified  by  economic 
"fundamentals", and those inflated by speculation.  Corporate borrowing 
during the late 1980s proved, with hindsight, to be much too large in relation 
to the underlying value of  assets.  When asset price inflation was reversed, a 
period  of  slowing and then  negative credit growth followed.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.8, which shows the AFI credit to GDP ratio and the 
aggregate asset price index as a ratio to the consumption deflator.  Both 
series appear to  have changed trend in an upward direction during the 
1980s. The decline in asset values at the end of  the 1980s leads the decline in 
the credit to GDP ratio.  There can be little doubt that this process is a 
painful one, with balance sheet restructuring by banks tending to make for 
cautious lending attitudes. 
Figure 2.8 
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These financial considerations appear to be a major explanation of  the slow 
nature of  the recovery at present.  While the demand for loans declined in 
line with business expectations during the recession, the supply curve of 
loans has also moved inwards.  Figure 2.9 shows the prime lending rate in nominal and real terms, as well as the after-tax real prime rate, during the 
early 1980s and early 1990s recessions.  Real lending rates remain high for 
this stage of  the cycle. 
However,  while  there  are  important  lessons  to  be  learned  from  the 
experiences  of  the  1980s, the  difficulties  implied  on the  basis  of  this 
experience  for  the  conduct of  monetary  policy  in  the  future  can  be 
exaggerated. This is because financial liberalisation of  the 1980s was a once- 
and-for-all major structural change. 
The removal of  constraints on financial intermediaries released  pent-up 
demand for investments. This contrib,uted to, and was reinforced by, strong 
growth and rising profits.  As expectations about future returns improved, 
and asset prices rose, financial institutions were prepared to lend more and 
more.  The problems of  managing this transition  to liberalised financial 
markets was then complicated by the positive feedback aspects of  asset price 
dynamics, that had not been fully foreseen, and hence excessive borrowing. 
In  these respects,  the  lack  of  experience of  policy  makers and market 
participants in asset price and borrowing dynamics in liberalised financial 
systems is likely to have been a contributory factor.6 
Figure 2.9 
Prime Rate and Private Demand 
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It is  worth noting that one has to go back to the 1890s and 1920s/30s to find parallel 
episodes. The general nature of  the difficulties encountered is underlined by the fact 
that Australia's experience was by no means unique.  While the household 
and corporate  sectors  were affected to  different degrees, most  other 
countries  that  liberalised  their  financial  markets had broadly  similar 
experiences.  Since  managing  the  transition  from  a  regulated  to  a 
deregulated financial system is now largely behind them, it is unlikely that 
these particular shocks will be repeated in these countries. 
One lesson that should not be drawn from the experiences of  the 1980s and 
early 1990s is that any asset price inflation is a bad thing.  Discussions about 
whether monetary policy should target asset price inflation directly come 
very close to this notion.7  This would be an over-reaction to recent events. 
Asset prices, it was noted earlier, adjust in response to expectations about 
future activity and returns, as well as in response to monetary policy and 
short-run speculative dynamics.  Asset price adjustments in response to 
changing fundamentals represent relative price shifts that have little to do 
with on-going inflation.  In this sense, it is doubtful whether economies will 
significantly recover from their current relatively weak state, and borrowing 
resume, until there is some improvement in fundamentals, and hence in the 
relative price of  assets.  The task for monetary policy  is to permit these 
relative price adjustments to occur, while avoiding speculative bubbles and 
excessively easy monetary policy when the upturn reaches a more mature 
stage. 
3.  THE EXCHANGE RATE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CYCLE 
(a)  Transmission of  the International Business Cycle 
As a small country which relies heavily on commodities for its export income, 
Australia is particularly vulnerable to external disturbances.  In 1991  /92, 
around 65 per  cent  of  Australia's  export  earnings were  from rural or 
resource-based  exports  (see  Table  3.1).  Furthermore,  a  very  large 
proportion of  Australian  imports are manufactured goods or  service^.^ 
This  was  discussed  at the recent  international  conference on  inflation  at  the 
Reserve Bank.  See Blundell-Wignall (ed.)  (1992). 
The split between commodity-based exports/iinports and mai~ufactures  is done at 
a  very  broad  level.  For  example, many of  the co~nmodity-based  imports are Being  determined in auction markets, prices  for primary  commodities 
fluctuate widely with cycles in world economic activity (see Figure 3.1), much 
more so than prices of  manufactured imports.  The Australian economy is 
therefore subject to substantial terms of  trade shocks 9. 
Table 3.1:  Composition of Australian Exports and Imports* 
(percentage of total goods and services) 
Exports  Imports 
Commodity based  64.5 
Manufactures  15.0 
Services  20.5 
*  See Appendix for definitions of  these categories. 
A  boom  in  the  rest  of  the  world  results  in  sharply higher  prices  for 
commodity exports, which increase the terms of  trade.  This impacts on the 
domestic economy primarily through income effects.  At existing levels of 
production, prices and exchange rates, excess demand for non-traded goods 
emerges, putting upward pressure on domestic inflation. 
Australia's terms of  trade are highly volatile, both in absolute terms artd 
relative  to  most  other  industrial  countries.  For  example,  there  were 
particularly sharp changes in the terms of  trade in 1972-1973 (a rise of  about 
45 per cent), 1985-1986 (a fall of  around 13 per cent) and 1987-1988 (a rise of 
almost  30 per cent).  Over the  period  1949 to  1991, the  average annual 
absolute percentage chai~ge  in the terins of  trade was 7.7 per cent;  the only 
processed food products which  could arguably be  included in manufactures;  if 
anything,  Table 3.1  overstates  the  importance  of commodities  in  Australian 
imports. 
Australia's  terms of  trade is  very highly positively  correlated  with commodity 
prices.  The correlation coefficient between  the quarterly change in  the terms of 
trade and quarterly changes in the RBA  commodity price index in SDRs over the 
period June 1983 to June 1992 is 0.71. country with a higher level of  volatility on this basis was New Zealand. 
Most European countries and the United States experienced around half 
this level of  volatility (see Appendix). 
Figure 3.1 
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The effect of  these swings in the terms of  trade on domestic income can be 
quite substantial.  Figure 3.2 shows four-quarter-ended changes in the terms 
of  trade, GDP, and GDP adjusted for the terms of  trade (GDP adj).lo When 
the terms of  trade falls, the adjusted GDP figure is lower than the standard 
GDP measure.  For example, the terms of  trade fell by around 13 per cent 
over 1985 and 1986.  This is estimated to have reduced growth in GDP by 
around 1;  percentage points.  Over 1987 and 1988, the terms of  trade rose by 
27 per cent, which was equivalent to a boost to GDP of  a little over 2 per 
lo  This adjustment is made to try to capture the effect of  terms of  trade changes on 
domestic purchasing power.  It is calculated by  revaluing exports of  goods and 
services by  the implicit price deflator (IPD) for imports of  goods and services to 
provide an estimate of  the purchasing power of exports over imports.  This value 
is then substituted for  the actual constant price  value of  exports of  goods and 
services and GDP calculated in the usual  way by summing expenditures.  For 
more details see Australian  Bureau of  Statistics Cat. No. 5206.0,  December  1990 
issue. cent per annum;  the subsequent decline in the terms of  trade effectively 
reduced GDP by a bit under 1  per cent per annum. 
Figure 3.2 
Gross Domestic Product and Terms of Trade 
%  four-quarters-ended percentage change  % 
For a small commodity-exporting country the equilibrium real exchange rate 
is strongly influenced by  the terms of  trade.11  When excess demand for 
non-traded goods emerges, as the terms of  trade rise, real exchange rate 
appreciation is the mechanism by which equilibrium is restored.  The link 
between the terms of  trade and the real exchange rate is shown in Figure 
3.3.  The decline in the terms of  trade through 1985 and 1986, for example, 
was accompanied by a sharp fall in the real exchange rate (achieved by a 
depreciation  of  the nominal exchange rate).  When  the  terms of  trade 
subsequently boomed in 1987 and 1988, the real exchange rate appreciated. 
The link between  the terms of  trade and the real exchange rate is well 
established in empirical research on the Australian economy.12 
11  This is shown more formally in Blundell-Wignall and Gregory (1990). 
l2  Blundell-Wignall and Thomas (1987) found that the Australian real exchange rate 
deviated from purchasing power parity, but that this deviation could be explained 
by  movements  in  the  terms  of  trade.  Blundell-Wignall  and Gregory  (1990) 
showed  that  a  long-run  relationship  could  be  established  between  the  real 
exchange  rate  and  the  terms  of  trade.  Furthermore,  they  showed  that  this 
relationship is significant in an error correction framework explaining changes in 
the  real  exchange  rate.  A  recent  updating  of  this  work  shows that  the real 
exchange rate and the terms of  trade are cointegrated. Figure 3.3 
Terms of Trade and Real Effective Exchange Rate 
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There  have been  periods,  though,  when  the  relationship between  the 
exchange rate and commodity prices has seemed more tenuous.  The real 
exchange rate appreciated through 1980, for example, despite a fairly flat 
terms of  trade.  More recently, the terms of  trade declined through 1990 and 
1991, with hardly any response from the real exchange rate, at least until 
1992.  This suggests the presence of  other influences on the real exchange 
rate.  The most  important amongst  these  is  changes  in  the stance of 
monetary policy, which might become necessary from time to  time as a result 
of  domestic real and monetary shocks.13  If the terms of  trade declined, but 
relatively tight monetary policy was required beca~lse  of  domestic inflation 
pressures,  the  exchange  rate  could  remain  at  relatively  high  levels, 
reinforcing downward pressure on prices.  Conversely, easy monetary policy 
l3  Gruen  and  Wilkinson  (1991) found  soine  evidence  of  a  stable  relationship 
between the Australian real exchange rate and the terms of  trade.  But  they  also 
found evidence of  a stable relatioi~sl~ip  between the real exchange rate and the real 
long-run interest differential over the post-float period.  Performing out of  sample 
forecasts for the period  October 1990 to March 1991, Gruen and Wilki~~son  found 
that the model  which  included  both  the terms of trade and  the real  long-run 
interest differential forecast the actual real exchange rate better than models wit11 
single explanators.  In particular, a model of  the real exchange rate including only 
the terms of trade over predicted the fall in the real excl~ai~ge  rate through 1991. in the face of  a rising terms of trade might see the exchange rate fail  to 
appreciate, reinforcing  upward  pressure  on  demand and, eventually, 
inflation. 
The way in which the real exchange rate adjusts to terms of trade shocks 
depends crucially on the degree of  flexibility of  the nominal exchange rate. 
At one extreme, if  the nominal exchange rate is fixed, a positive terms of 
trade shock will push up domestic demand and economic activity, resulting 
in  increased  domestic  inflation.  This  gradually appreciates  the  real 
exchange rate, eventually restoring equilibrium.  Conversely, a negative 
terms of  trade shock under fixed  exchange rates causes a  downturn in 
economic activity and rising unemployment,  until lower  inflation  than 
abroad causes the real exchange rate to depreciate.  Since goods prices are 
relatively "sticky",  these adjustments can be long and relatively painful.  On 
the  other  hand, if  the  nominal exchange rate is  floating,  the  required 
adjustment in  the real  exchange rate can be achieved by appreciation or 
depreciation of  the noininal exchange rate. This would offset to some degree 
the impact on economic activity and inflation of  the terms of  trade shock. 
Nominal exchange rate appreciation in response to a terms of  trade boom, 
for example, will induce substitution in domestic demand towards imports 
and away from domestically produced goods.  Furthermore, the decline in 
import prices will impact directly on the domestic price level, to the extent 
that final goods and services and inputs to the domestic production process 
are imported. This point will be picked up in a later section. 
(b)  Resource Allocation and the Performance of  the Traded Sector 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that the way in which the 
international business cycle impacts on the Australian economy should have 
changed with the floating of  the exchange rate.  A  floating exchange rate 
helps to insulate the domestic economy from the world commodity price 
cycle, facilitating the  task of  monetary policy in achieving low and stable 
inflation.  However, this might be achieved at the cost of  greater instability 
in the traded-goods sector.  In particular, it has often bee11 argued that the 
swings in  international competitiveness stemming from  terms of  trade 
fluctuations distort resource allocation decisions and adversely impact on the performance of  the import-competing and non-commodity exporting 
sectors.14 
Exchange rate appreciation in the face of  a terms of  trade rise has relatively 
less impact on commodity exporters, who tend to be buffered by the high 
foreign currency prices for their exports.  Manufacturers, on the other hand, 
will be less competitive, as the exchange rate has appreciated but the foreign 
price of  their goods has not risen as much (given the "sticky"  nature of 
manufactured goods prices).  Furthermore, import-competing industries will 
lose market share as consumers switch to  purchasing relatively cheaper 
imports.  If  the movement in the real exchange rate is large enough and 
prolonged, many of  the firms in these sectors may reduce investment, or go 
out of  business, leaving them positioned very poorly to take advantage of  a 
lower exchange rate once the commodity price cycle turns down again.  Any 
assessment of  Australia's experience with the conduct of  monetary policy 
since the floating of  the exchange rate needs to review just  how important 
these "costs" have been. 
Econometric  evidence  shows  that  relative  prices  are  an  important 
determinant of  import  demand, and hence  will  impact on the  import- 
competing sector of  the economy.  W  ilkinson (1992) uses cointegration 
techniques to estimate the demand for imports, and finds the long-run price 
elasticity of  demand to  be 0.5;  a  1 per cent  rise in the relative  price of 
imports results in a 0.5 per cent fall in imports over the long-run.  While this 
elasticity may not seem large, a substantial swing in relative prices may, 
nevertheless, imply a large impact on import demand. 
Swings in relative prices should also irnpact on the non-commodity export 
sector.  But despite some substantial movements in the real excl~ange  rate 
over the 1980s, there has bee11  consistently strong growth in manufactured 
exports in recent years.  Figure 3.4 shows the voluine of  Australian exports 
broken  down  into  three  categories:  rural,  resource-based  and 
A 
l4  As discussed  in  the previous section, swings in  the terms of  trade will  result  in 
swings in the real  exchange rate even if  the nominal exchange rate is fixed, since 
there will be an impact on domestic prices.  The objection to the floating exchange 
rate in this context is an objection  to  the speed of  adjustment and the possibility 
that the nominal (hence the real) exchange rate will overshoot. manufactures.15  Manufactured exports have shown the strongest growth 
over the 1980s, picking up substantially from the middle of the decade, albeit 
from a relatively low base.  In  the early 1980s, manufactured  products 
represented around 12 per cent of  merchandise export volumes;  in 1991/92 
the  proportion  was  19  per  cent.  Furthermore,  if  we  include 
simply-transformed  manufactures,  such  as iron, steel  and aluminium, 
manufactured exports are now as large as rural exports. 
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In order to explore the implications of  this observation for monetary policy, 
it is necessary to identify the reasons why the manufactured-export sector 
has  performed  well,  despite  some  sharp changes  in  competitiveness 
associated with the floating exchange rate.  If other factors can be identified 
l5  The  categories  in  this  figure  essentially  correspond  to  those  in  Table  3.1. 
Manufactures in  this case is as close as we can get to  elaborately  transformed 
manufactures.  Simply transformed  manufactures such as  iron  and steel  and 
aluminium (which have also expanded very rapidly in  recent years) are included 
in resource based exports.  See Appendix for details. which ameliorate the impact of  exchange rate swings on the traded goods 
sector, while also promoting its longer-run growth, monetary policy  can 
focus on low inflation without incurring serious resource allocation costs. 
The remainder of  this section attempts to identify these factors. 
At a very broad level, the growth in manufactured exports is part of  a more 
general trend towards increasing international integration of  the Australian 
economy.  Exports and imports of  goods and services have  risen  as a 
proportion of  domestic production over the  1980s (see Figure 3.5).  This 
partly reflects benefits of  the focus of  micro-economic policy  in Australia 
over the past decade.  Tariffs were reduced over the 1970s and 1980s, and 
there is a timetable for further reductions over the 1990s (see Figure 3.6).  As 
would be expected, imports have risen as a proportion of  domestic spending, 
but the strong export performance requires further explanation. 
Figure 3.5 
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One  important  reason  for  the  good  performance  of  Australian 
manufactured exports is geography.  In particular, strong growth and rising 
real incomes in the Asian region16 have presented plenty of  opportunities for 
exporting.  Table 3.2 shows growth in various regions since 1986. 
Table 3.2:  Growth in Production 




Asia (excl. Brunei) 
The result for Australia has been a geographical shift in our exports towards 
the Asian region (see Table 3.3). 
l6  The  definition  of  Asia  used  is  ASEAN  (Brunei,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  The 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), Korea,  Taiwan, Hong Kong  and China. 
Where data problems necessitate a departure from this definition, it is noted in 
the text.  Japan always is separately identified. But the growth in manufactured exports is not simply the result of  strong 
demand from Asian markets;  there is also evidence of  increasing market 
penetration.  Table 3.4 shows growth in Australian manufactured exports to 
various regions, and growth in manufactured imports by those regions, over 
the period 1986 to 1990.17 Although exports to Asia have largely been driven 
by the strong growth in this region, there are some indications of  a rise in 
market share.  Moreover, this is an improvement on the  1970s and early 
1980s, when market share in this region was falling. 
Even more striking is the fact that  there have been substantial gains in 
market share in Australia's more traditional markets.  Most notable here is 
North America, where Australian manufactured exports have grown four 
times faster than imports into that region.  There were also substantial 
gains in  market share in New Zealand and Europe.  Increasing market 
penetration cannot be explained by Australia's  geographical good fortune. 
It also contradicts the view that substantial swings in the real exchange rate 
are highly damaging for non-commodity exports. 
Table 3.3:  Direction of Merchandise Exports 
(percentage of  total exports) 
Total  Mai~ufactures 
North America  11  -3  11.0  13.6  16.0 
EEC  14.2  12.5  14.0  14.2 
Japan  28.4  26.5  4.2  7.9 
New Zealand  4.6  5.2  21.1  18.8 
Asia  20.6  30.4  19.5  27.5 
Other  21  .O  14.4  27.5  15.7 
- 
l7  These regions together represent around 85 per cent of  our ~nanufactured  exports; 
see Table 3.3.  Due to data limitations, the growth rates in Table 3.4 are calculated 
using  values  rather  than  volumes.  To  overcolne  proble~ns  due to  different 
inflation rates, the data are all in  US dollars. Table 3.4: Growth in Manufactured Exports 1986-1990 
(average annual percentage change) 
Country/region  Australian  Manufactured  Percentage of 
manufactured  imports  Australian 
exports  manufactured 
exports (1990) 
Hong Kong  20.5  25.3  3.4 
Singapore  29.3  27.9  3.5 
Korea  36.5  21.6  1.7 
Thailand  39.7  42.5  1.7 
Indonesia  45.1  21 .O  2.8 
Philippines  33.5  29.7  0.7 
Malaysia  27.7  26.6  1.6 
Total ~sia"  30.8  26.4  15.3 
Japan  29.6  26.3  5.0 
North America  30.0  7.5  11  .O 
New Zealand  22.5  12.8  14.1 
OECD Europe  27.5  16.1  10.6 
*  This definition of  Asia is slightly different from that in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
In  particular, this definition excludes Taiwan, China and Brunei as data on 
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Mar 70 = 100  Index Increased market share was probably helped by a general improvement in 
competitiveness over the 1980s.  Figure 3.7 shows the real effective exchange 
rate over the 1980s and early 1990s;  the horizontal lines show the averages 
for the first half of  the 1980s and the second half.  In the middle of  the 1980s 
the exchange rate depreciated sharply, in response to the declining terms of 
trade and an external debt crisis, reaching a low point in December 1986. 
This depreciation, of  around one third from its previous peak, certainly 
benefited the competitiveness of  the non-commodity exporting sector.  Nor 
did the subsequent appreciation, as the terms of  trade rose, eliminate all of 
these gains.  On average, the real exchange rate was lower in the second 
half of the 1980s than it was in the previous five years. 
Although the extreme low level of  the real exchange rate during 1986 was 
not  maintained  for  long,  the  improvement  in  competitiveness  was 
sufficiently large to encourage some investment in the export sector and to 
facilitate entry into foreign markets.  Once a "beachhead" is established in a 
foreign market, it  is  unlikely to  be  easily surrendered, even at a higher 
exchange rate, given the sunk costs of  entering those markets.  Here it is 
worth noting that local  knowledge, the development of distribution and 
service systems, personal contacts, and the like are known to be important 
factors for entering and maintaining a presence in  many world markets. 
Under these circumstances, the real exchange rate would have to move by a 
substantial amount to reverse previous gains. 
Aside from improved relative prices and "beachhead" phenomena, it is also 
likely that microeconoinic reform and reduced protection  of  the domestic 
market through tariff cuts, together with some export-assistance measures, 
have stimulated a more outward-looking export orientatioi~. Tariff  cuts 
remove incentives for rent seeking behaviour on the part of  businessmen, 
facilitating an  export  "culture".  New industries are finding "niches"  in 
external markets, where research and development, quality, marketing and 
reliability  of  supply  are  iil~portant  considerations  which  affect 
competitiveness, but  do not  depend on relative  prices.  Furthermore, 
reducing  tariffs  on  iil~ported  goods  that  are  inputs  to  the  domestic 
production  process  eliminates  what  is essentially a tax  on  exports.  In 
contrast, export assistance measures are a subsidy. While they should not be 
continued in the long run, they can be useful in breaking down barriers to 
entry. Generally speaking, it is difficult to isolate the contribution of  various export 
assistance  measures. 18 Some  categories which  receive  assistance  have 
grown strongly over the past six years or so, but others which receive no 
assistance have also expanded rapidly, while a number of  assisted exports 
have grown more slowly. Some evidence on this is presented in Table A2 in 
the Appendix.  It shows average annual growth in manufactured  export 
volumes by SITC division, and contributions to growth of  these categories 
over the period 1986/87 to 1991  /92. 
These data confirm that the assisted categories have made a relatively large 
contribution to the recent growth in manufactured exports (see column 5). 
Assisted  exports contributed  52 per cent of  the growth in manufactured 
export volumes over the period 1986/87 to 1991/92.  This is because most of 
the  assisted  categories are  fairly  large;  the  eleven  assisted  categories 
identified in Table A2  (out of  a total of  33 categories) accounted for almost 
50 per cent of  manufactured export volumes in 1986/87. 
On the  other hand, there is not an overwhelming tendency for assisted 
exports to have grown more quickly than unassisted exports over the period 
(see  column 4).  Of  the  top  ten  fastest  growing  categories,  six  were 
unassisted.  In total, assisted exports grew on average by 15.7 per cent per 
annum, while unassisted exports grew by 13.6 per cent per annum.  This 
does not appear to be a significant difference when taking into account the 
dispersion of  the growth rates.  So although a large part of  the total growth 
is due to assisted exports,  the strong growth in a broad range of  small 
categories suggests  that  there  is something more  fundamental  driving 
growth as well. 
Whatever the explanations, the rising importance of  manufactured (and for 
that matter services) exports, has helped Australia to begin the process of 
diversifying away from its traditional reliance on coinmodity exports. 
'8  For  a  listing  of  the  various  types  of export  assistance  measures see Industry 
Commission (1992). (c)  Implications for Monetary Policy 
It has been argued so far that the floating of the $A  in  December  1983 
changed the nature of  the transmission of  the international business cycle to 
the Australian economy. Sustained movements in commodity prices impact 
relatively  more  on  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  for  a  given  stance  of 
monetary policy, and less on domestic production and prices. This facilitates 
the task of  monetary policy in achieving a low-inflation outcome, insofar as 
pressures on activity (and hence inflation) result from movements in the 
terms of  trade.  Furthermore, the evidence from section 3(b) suggests that 
nominal  exchange  rate  swings  have  not  had  any  obvious  adverse 
consequences for the performance of  the  non-commodity export sector, 
which is important for longer-term productivity and growth. 
But  the exchange rate  also impacts directly  on the domestic price  level 
through its effect  on import prices.  For  example, a depreciation in  the 
nominal exchange rate will, for given foreign prices, raise the domestic price 
of  imported goods and services.  If  these are final goods and services then, 
other things equal, the price faced by the final purchaser will also rise.  If  the 
goods and services are inputs to the production process, then there may be a 
further impact, as domestic producers pass 011  their cost increase to domestic 
consumers.  In general, the extent to which exchange rate changes affect the 
domestic  price  level  will  depend  on  the  proportion  of  wholly  or 
predominantly imported goods and services in our consumption bundle, and 
the extent to which imported inputs are used in the domestic production 
process.19 
l9  Estimates of the total impact of  exchange rate changes on the domestic price level 
are difficult to  calculate.  Richards and 5tevens (1987) used a "mark-up" model of 
domestic  price  determination  to  calculate  the  impact  of  the  exchange  rate 
depreciation through 1985 and 1986 on the domestic price level.  They estimated 
that the elasticity of  domestic prices with respect  to  the exchange rate was 0.35. 
That is, a 10 per cent depreciation in  the exchange rate is estimated to add 3.5 per 
cent to the domestic price level, as measured by the consumer price index (CPI). 
Stevens (1992) modelled changes in the CPI as a function of  lagged changes in the 
CPI, the output gap, cl~ai~ges  in  import prices and a "wage shock".  He found the 
sum of the  lagged  coefficients  on import  prices  to  be betiveen  0.05  and 0.1 
(depending on the sar~~ple  period).  This is significantly less  than  Richards and 
Stevens estimates.  Blundell-Wignall, Lowe and Tarditi (1992) find lagged changes 
in  import prices sum to  around 0.2, in  an equation explaining the consumption 
deflator.  Both  studies may, however, underestimate the second round effects  of 
rising import prices on the prices of  domestically produced goods. These direct effects are also an important consideration for monetary policy. 
If  the exchange rate adjusted only according to changes in its underlying 
equilibrium determined by the terms of  trade, the above discussion suggests 
that  it  should have negligible consequences for domestic inflation.  The 
inflationary impact of  exchange rate depreciation would be considerably 
offset by the deflationary impact of  the fall in the terms of  trade.  However, 
there are two other important influences on exchange rates, which  are 
exactly analogous to those discussed earlier in  the context of  other asset 
prices,  First, monetary policy directly influences the nominal exchange rate 
in a world of  highly  mobile capital.  Excessive  easing or tightening of 
monetary  policy  will  be  transmitted  into domestic inflation  outcomes 
through movements in the exchange rate.  Secondly, exchange markets are 
also affected  by  the speculative dynamics, including positive  feedback, 
described by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990).  For example, the very 
sharp fall in the $A during the mid 1980s is widely believed to have overshot 
as a consequence of  such speculation. As the experience of  this time showed, 
such overshooting can have significant effects on domestic prices.  Such 
inflation pressure may become in-grained, if  wage-price interactions result. 
It is therefore of  some interest to consider whether some of  the structural 
developments considered earlier might have caused the direct impact of  the 
exchange rate on inflation  to change over time.  Increased  competition 
resulting from tariff reductions, for example, might reduce the importance 
of  direct exchange rate effects because: 
it becomes more difficult to pass on increases in the price of  intermediate 
inputs; or 
firms may be less willing to accede to wage demands in response to higher 
prices. 
Furthermore, a reduction in  the  tariff  rate reduces the magnifying effect 
which an ad-valorem tariff has on changes in import prices. 
Working against these effects, the increasing international integration of the 
economy (partly as a result of  tariff  reductions) ineal-rs that an increasing 
proportion  of  goods consumed  and used  as inputs to  production  are imported.  This implies that import prices may have become more important 
for domestic prices over time. 
With the underlying economic structure changing over time, estimating a 
structural model with constant coefficients is inappropriate.  But temporal 
ordering tests, such as those  carried out in  Blundell-Wignall, Lowe  and 
Tarditi (1992)) can give an indication of  the information content of  variables 
without constructing a full structural model.  Given the changed role of  the 
traded-goods  sector  discussed  above,  it  is  of  interest  to  see  if  the 
informational  content  of  import  prices  for  domestic inflation  has  also 
changed over time. 
To approach this question, the Blundell-Wignall/Lowe/Tarditi  equation is 
estimated over the period 1967Q4 to 1984Q1, and the11  a series of  rolling 
regressions are performed by adding successive observations to the sample 
period.  The final regression of  the series is run over the period 1967Q4 to 
1992Q2. Specifically, the following equation is estimated: 
where P is the consumption deflator, TOT is the terms of  trade and MP is 
import prices.  The objective here is to exainine whether the informational 
content  of  import  prices  for  domestic  inflation  has  changed since  the 
beginning  of  1984,  the  first  quarter  of the  floating  exchange  regime. 
Blundell-Wignall  et.  al.  found  evidence  of  a  structural  break  in  the 
relationship between domestic inflation, the terms of  trade and iiuport prices 
at this time, so it seems a logical point to begin the regressions. 
The results of  these rollii~g  regressions are showi~  in Figure 3.8. The dashed 
line shows the suin of  the coefficients on the terms of  trade as progressively 
more  observations are added to  the  estimation period.  The sum of the 
coefficients on the terms of  trade is fairly stable.  Over the period to 1984Q1. it  is  0.19  and significantly  different  from zero at the  1 per cent  level. 
Successive estimates vary at most by about one fifth of  a standard error 
from the initial sum, and by  the end of  the period its value is 0.2, also 
significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level. 
Figure 3.8 
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The  solid  line  shows the  sum of  the  coefficients  on  import  prices  as 
progressively more observations are added. Unlike the terins of  trade, these 
estimates do not appear to be stable;  the information content of  import 
prices for domestic inflation appears to change between the beginning and 
the end of  the period.  When the equation is estimated up to the March 
quarter 1984, the sum of  coefficients is not significantly different from zero 
even at the 10 per  cent level.  That is, import price changes provide no 
information on domestic inflation which is not already contained in either 
past inflation or terms of  trade changes. As progressively more observations 
are added to  the estimation  period, the sum of  the  coefficients  trends 
upwards.  By  the end of  the period, the sum of  coefficients is 0.2, and this 
estimate is significantly different froin zero at the I per cent level. This finding suggests that import prices have become a more important 
indicator of domestic inflation in recent years.  This result would be expected 
as the Australian economy becomes more integrated with the world.  The 
significance of this result is that the exchange rate will have relatively more 
weight in domestic monetary policy considerations. 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Following the liberalisation of  Australia's financial markets, there have been 
important changes in  the characteristics of  the business cycle and the 
monetary transmission mechanism.  Monetary policy now works primarily 
through  movements  in  interest  rates,  which  induce  wealth  and 
intertemporal substitution effects.  But the transition to this market-oriented 
system from the more liquidity-constrained  financial environment  that 
preceded it, was not an entirely smooth process. 
During the  1980s, improved  fundamentals  and financial  liberalisation 
combined to pus11  up asset values and borrowing in a period of  buoyant 
business expectations.  The evidence suggests, however, that speculative 
dynamics characterised by positive  feedback  and international spillover 
effects may have pushed the process too far.  Two lessons were drawn from 
this.  First, asset prices (and borrowing) may be  relatively insensitive to 
interest rates when speculative dynamics are present.  Second, asset values 
are important in financial intermediaries'  lending decisions, regardless of 
what is driving them.  If  they overshoot, and then decline, the quality of 
banks'  outstanding loans is undermined, and a period of  cautious lending 
attitudes may follow. Such effects appear to change the usual pattern of the 
business cycle.  Such episodes can coinplicate the task of  monetary policy. 
During the upswing phase, authorities must choose between raising interest 
rates higher than otherwise or, alternatively, permitting asset values and 
borrowing to rise even higher, with prospects for greater financial fragility 
problems later on. 
It  was argued, however,  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  extrapolate  the 
difficulties of  conducting monetary policy in  the second half  of  the 1980~~ 
given the structural changes under way at that time.  Policy makers should 
certainly  not  over react,  by  coming to  regard  asset  price  changes as unacceptable.  Proposals to target asset price inflation in much the same way 
as goods price inflation come very close to such a judgment.  The price of 
assets relative to prices of  goods changes in response to expectations about 
future activity.  Such relative price changes play a key role in business cycle 
dynamics.  In this sense, improved growth of the Australian economy, and 
elsewhere, may require better fundamentals and an increase in the relative 
value of  assets as a pre-requisite.  This need not risk increased goods price 
inflation, though later in the cycle it will be important to ensure that asset 
price inflation does not become excessive. 
The floating of  the $A has also affected the nature of  the Australian business 
cycle, by fundamentally altering the way in which the international business 
cycle is transmitted to the domestic economy.  Real income shocks arising 
from fluctuations in Australia's terins of trade, which is strongly influenced 
by the world commodity price cycle, often drove bouts of  inflation when the 
exchange  rate  was  more heavily  managed.  Since  the  floating  of  the 
exchange rate, this source of  pressure on domestic production and (via the 
Phillips  curve) inflation  has,  for  the  most  part, been  eliminated.  The 
counterpart to  this, however, has been sharp swings in  the nominal (and 
real) exchange rate.  Such swings affect performance in the traded-goods 
sector, and also lead to direct effects on domestic prices and wages. Both are 
important  considerations  in  any assessment  of  Australia's  approach to 
monetary policy. 
An intriguing aspect of  Australia's recent economic performance, however, 
is that manufactured exports have performed extraordinarily well  in  the 
face of major swings in  the exchange rate.  The sharp fall in  the exchange 
rate in the middle of  the 1980s inay have helped to stimulate investment in 
the non-commodity exporting sector, while also facilitating initial entry into 
foreign markets.  Once "beachl~eads"  were established, the partial reversal 
of these competitiveness gains in the second half of  the 1980s did not have a 
symmetric adverse impact.  In addition, there have been substantial changes 
in Australia's linkages with the rest of the world.  Policies to internationalise 
the Australian econoiny through reduced protection and other measures 
have seen non-commodity exports rise as a share of  GDP. This is explained 
partly by sustained strong growth in  the Asia-Pacific region, and partly by 
Australian  manufacturing exporters improving their  market share in a 
number of regions.  The apparent importance of  these other factors, inlplies that monetary policy focused on low inflation need not be associated with 
major  resource  allocation  costs  as  the  exchange  rate  ad.justs  to 
terms-of-trade shocks. 
Increased internationalisation has also seen Australian  imports rise as a 
share of  GDP.  This factor suggests that  import prices,  and hence  the 
exchange rate, have become more important for domestic inflation and 
monetary policy considerations. APPENDIX 
(a) Volatility of the terms of trade 
The volatility of  the terms of  trade of a number of industrial countries is 
calculated over the period 1949 to 1991 (except where noted by an *).  The 
data are annual and obtained from the International Financial Statistics. 
The terms of  trade is defined as the ratio of  export unit values to import unit 
values.  The  volatility  is  measured  as  the  average  annual  absolute 
percentage change in the terms of  trade;  that is the average size of  the 
annual percentage change without  regard  to  sign.  These statistics are 
reported  in column 2  below.  The table also reports the average annual 
percentage change and the standard deviation of  these changes. 
Table Al: Terms of Trade 


























Mean  Standard 
Deviation *  Germany  1953-  1991,  Greece  1952-199  1,  Iceland  1957-  1990,  Ireland 
1954-1991,  Japan 1952-1991, Spain 1957-1991, Switzerland  1949-1987, 
United Kingdom 1950-1991. 
(b) Growth in manufactured exports 
Table A2 ranks manufactured exports by their contribution to growth over 
the period 1986/87 to 1991/92.  Shaded rows indicate Standard Industrial 
Trade Classification  (SITC) divisions which  consist  predominantly  of 
products receiving some form of direct export assistance as identified by the 
Industry Commission (1992). 
(c) Commodity classification of exports and imports 
Exports and imports are broadly  classified  into three categories:  rural; 
resource based and manufactures, using data from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics.  Table A3 shows the corresponding SITC sections or divisions 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table A3:  Commodity Classification of  Exports and Imports 





Figure 3.4 differs very slightly from this classification  in that beverages 
(SITC division 11) is included in manufactured exports rather than rural. REFERENCES 
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